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Direct reciprocity can establish stable cooperation. Nevertheless, the significance of this mechanism 
is yet unclear. A frequent assumption is that both commodity and context should be the same when 
help is exchanged between social partners. Yet, an exchange of different favours appears more likely 
in a natural setting. This is assumed to be cognitively demanding, however, because experienced help 
in one context needs to change the motivation to help by different means or in a different context. 
We tested whether Norway rats, Rattus norvegicus, transfer help from one cooperative task to 
another. Individuals could provide food to previously either cooperating or defecting partners by using 
a different mechanism to produce food for their partner than the partner had used to help them. Test 
subjects indeed helped previously cooperative partners more often than defecting ones by using a 
different provisioning mechanism. This implies that rats realize the cooperative propensity of social 
partners, which they consequently reward by help of a different kind; hence, they do not merely copy 
experienced helping behaviour. Our results suggest that animals other than primates are capable of 
transferring help between different contexts, which highlights new possibilities for the occurrence of 
reciprocal altruism involving different commodities and services in nature. 
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Introduction 
The evolution and maintenance of cooperative interactions between unrelated individuals can be 
explained by the reciprocal exchange of roles between participants (Taborsky, Frommen, & Riehl, 
2016; Trivers, 1971). Individuals showing direct reciprocity help those that have previously helped 
them (Axelrod & Hamilton, 1981). Many experimental studies have demonstrated direct reciprocity in 
nonhuman animals (e.g. Amici et al., 2014; Carter & Wilkinson, 2013; Rutte & Taborsky, 2008, for a 
review see Taborsky et al., 2016) but its importance in nature has been questioned (Clutton-Brock, 
2009; Hammerstein, 2003). Usually, the concept of reciprocity is applied only to situations where the 
same social service or commodity is returned to the same social partner in a similar context. However, 
there is no reason to assume that the occurrence of reciprocity is confined to such narrowly defined 
conditions. More likely, help or social service received in one context should increase the propensity 
to help a partner also in a different context in the future. This may apply when social partners have 
changed, such as in generalized reciprocity (Barta, McNamara, Huszár, & Taborsky, 2011; Pfeiffer, 
Rutte, Killingback, Taborsky, & Bonhoeffer, 2005; Rutte & Taborsky, 2008), or when the opportunity 
to return a received favour to the same partner has changed, for instance if a different task is required. 
Experimental studies involving given and received favours in different tasks are rare, despite growing 
correlative evidence (Carter & Wilkinson, 2013; Fraser & Bugnyar, 2012; Romero & Aureli, 2008). 
Preconditions for direct reciprocity include individual recognition and memory of the outcome of past 
interactions with specific social partners, which is thought to be cognitively demanding (Brosnan, 
Salwiczek, & Bshary, 2010; Stevens & Hauser, 2004). In addition, cooperating across different services 
implies (1) an understanding of help received from a specific individual and (2) transferring this 
information to a different service in order to pay back the other, previously received service. There is 
good evidence that some nonhuman animals exchange different cooperative services reciprocally 
(reviewed in Taborsky et al., 2016). In monkeys, for example, grooming often seems to be traded 
against other social services (Borgeaud & Bshary, 2015; Cheney et al., 2010; Fruteau et al., 2009; 
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Hemelrijk, 1994). Experiments on free-ranging vervet monkeys, Chlorocebus pygerythrus, showed that 
individuals respond more strongly to solicitations for aid of unrelated social partners that had 
groomed them before (Seyfarth & Cheney, 1984), and that individuals providing food to the group are 
subsequently groomed more often by group members (Fruteau et al., 2009).  
Although trading different services is very widespread in humans and therefore seems intuitive to us, 
it may be cognitively demanding (Stevens & Gilby, 2004). When, for example, grooming is exchanged 
for social support (Seyfarth & Cheney, 1984), that is, individual X grooms Y (= service A) and Y will 
support X in a fight against Z later on (= service B), this implies both (1) the perception of somehow 
corresponding payoffs of services A and B, and (2) that a cooperative state is associated with a specific 
individual. If the association of a cooperative state with specific individuals is dynamic, that is, it is 
updated accordingly over a series of interactions, this would enable group members to cooperate 
reciprocally with specific partners over different contexts based either on associative learning or on a 
change in attitudes (de Waal, 2000) or emotions (Schino, di Sorrentino, & Tiddi, 2007); this works 
without needing to keep track of the exact outcome of every interaction. In contrast, copying the 
helpful behaviour of a specific partner would imply memory about, and a specific response to, every 
single interaction, which would hardly lead to cooperation across different contexts. 
Norway rats, Rattus norvegicus, help social partners to obtain food if they have been helped in a 
similar way by the same or different individuals, that is, they show direct and generalized reciprocity 
in an iterated prisoner’s dilemma situation (Dolivo & Taborsky, 2015b; Rutte & Taborsky, 2007, 2008; 
Schneeberger, Dietz, & Taborsky, 2012; Wood, Kim, & Li, 2016). Rats are highly social animals, forming 
groups of various sizes (McGuire, Pizzuto, Bemis, & Getz, 2006; Telle, 1966), sharing food (Barnett & 
Spencer, 1951) and coordinating cooperative behaviour (Schuster, 2002). There is evidence that they 
show transitive inference, that is, if an option A is more valuable than B and B is more valuable than 
C, then A is perceived to be also more valuable than C (Roberts & Phelps, 1994). Hence, Norway rats 
seem to be an ideal model to test for the propensity of animals to return received favours by different 
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tasks. In this study, we expanded an established experimental paradigm where rats provide food to a 
social partner by pulling a movable platform by a second, similarly intuitive mechanism, through which 
food can be delivered to the partner by pushing a lever. Thus, focal rats experienced social partners 
as cooperating ‘pushers’ and defecting ‘nonpushers’, as well as cooperating ‘pullers’ and defecting 
‘nonpullers’ in a full factorial design. Thereafter, the focal rats always had access to the alternative 
mechanism to that of their partners to provide food for them. If rats realize the difference between 
cooperating and defecting providers, we predicted that they should be more likely to use an 
alternative food-provisioning mechanism to help a previously cooperative partner than a previously 
defecting partner. 
 
Methods 
Experimental subjects and holding conditions 
We used outbred wild-type adult (1-year-old) female Norway rats (source: Animal Physiology 
Department, University of Groningen, the Netherlands) weighing on average 300 g. The rats were 
habituated to handling right after weaning and hence did not show any signs of stress when being 
handled, transported to the experimental cage and exposed to the set-up. They were individually 
colour marked and housed with littermates in groups of five sisters in order to provide a social 
environment (Sharp, Zammit, Azar, & Lawson, 2003). The cages (80x50 cm and 37.5 cm high) were 
separated from each other by opaque walls to exclude visual contact between the groups. In 
accordance with the animal welfare legislation of Switzerland (Tierschutzverordnung Schweiz 
04/2008) we enriched the cages with various materials (a wooden house and board, a tunnel, a piece 
of wood to nibble, a cardboard roll to play with, digging material (wood shavings), nest-building 
material (hay) and a salt block, as suggested by established animal care guidelines (Forbes, Blom, 
Kostmitsopoulus, Moore, & Perretta, 2007). Food (conventional rat pellets) and water were provided 
ad libitum. In addition, rats received a corn mix, fresh fruits or vegetables once a day. The ambient 
5 
 
temperature was 20 °C ± 1 °C, with a relative humidity of 50–60% and a 12:12 h light:dark cycle with 
lights on at 2000 hours and 30 min of dawn and dusk. As rats are primarily nocturnal, all training and 
experiments were conducted during the dark phase under red light (Norton, Culver, & Mullenix, 1975). 
Pre-experimental training 
The experimental set-up was based on a two-player sequential food exchange task (de Waal & Berger, 
2000; Rutte & Taborsky, 2007). Test cages (80x50 cm and 37.5 cm high) were divided in half by a wire 
mesh. All focal and partner rats experienced the following training prior to the experiment. 
Pulling task 
First, every rat was trained to pull a stick that was connected to a movable platform in order to receive 
a food item (one oat flake). The experimenter moved the platform consistently out of the cage over 
several training sessions, teaching the rats to pull the stick to reach the reward. In the second part of 
the training, a sister of the rat was placed in the second cage compartment. From then on, the rats 
(termed donors) did not get a reward themselves for pulling the platform; instead, only their partner 
(the recipient) received one. The roles of donor and recipient were regularly exchanged, and the 
intervals between these alternations were increased gradually from switching the roles after each pull 
to switching them after series of pulls lasting up to 7 min, which corresponds to the experimental 
period (see Dolivo & Taborsky, 2015a for a detailed plan of the training scheme). We noted the 
individuals pulling the most in 12 cages. Afterwards, we randomly chose six of these 12 individuals to 
serve as ‘cooperative partners’ in the experiment. In addition, six rats were trained to refrain from 
pulling by blocking the platform during the 7 min of exposure to the social partner in the training 
phase. These six rats were randomly chosen from the original population, and they served as defectors 
in the experiment. 
Pushing task 
This training was also divided into two parts. First, rats were trained to push a lever, which opened a 
connected trapdoor in a tube, through which a reward was delivered into the cage from above (see 
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Appendix Fig. A1). In the second training phase, the rats were again paired with a sister. Similar to the 
training of the pulling task, from then on the rats never received a reward for themselves when 
pushing the lever. Again, the same 12 partner rats were trained to be either cooperators or defectors. 
Test procedure 
During the experience phase, focal rats experienced cooperators producing rewards by either pulling 
the platform into the focal rat’s compartment or by pushing a lever so that food dropped into the cage 
from above. Defectors did not produce any food. During the test phase, the roles were exchanged and 
focal rats could now produce food for their social partner (cooperator or defector) by pushing the 
lever or pulling the platform. In all cases, rats had to use the alternative mechanism to the one they 
had experienced before, thus making pure copying of actions impossible. Each focal rat (N= 28) was 
tested four times with two different cooperators and two different defectors, either with the pulling 
or the pushing task (Fig. 1). Focal rats were unrelated and had never met the social partners 
(cooperator and defector) prior to the experiment. The treatment order (cooperator or defector and 
social partner pushes or pulls) was randomly chosen using the Excel command ‘RANDBETWEEN’. 
Behavioural data 
During both phases, pushes and pulls were counted and the latency to the first event was measured. 
All focal rats (eight of the original 28 tested rats) that nibbled the wooden stick during the ‘pulling’ 
task were excluded from all analyses, as we were unable to exclude potential selfish motivations 
underlying the operation of the apparatus. A previous study showed that nibbling the stick increases 
pulling rates while the pulling frequency has no clear relation to the social context (Schweinfurth & 
Taborsky, 2016). 
Statistical analyses 
To test whether focal rats reciprocate help by different tasks, we analysed the total number of 
donations using a generalized liner mixed model. We assumed a Poisson distribution as the dependent 
variable was count data. We included cooperation level (cooperator or defector) and order of 
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mechanisms (push → pull or pull → push) as main factors. Focal identity was included as a random 
effect because focal rats were tested repeatedly in all four situations. We checked for overdispersion, 
which was not the case. For the latency to donate the first time we analysed the data using a time to 
event analysis (Cox proportional hazard model). We included the cooperation level of partners 
(cooperating versus defecting) and the task (partner pulled versus pushed) as fixed factors. Further, 
we included the identity of focal rats as a frailty term to account for multiple testing. To simplify the 
models, we removed the nonsignificant interactions between the main effects (Engqvist, 2005). All 
statistical analyses were performed using R (version 2.15.2; packages ‘lme4’ and ‘survival’; The R 
Foundation for Statistical Computing, Vienna, Austria, http://www.r-project.org). 
Ethical note 
The housing of the animals and the experimental procedure were authorized by the Swiss Federal 
Veterinary Office under licence BE25/14. There was no possibility of physical contact between the test 
individuals, as a wire mesh separated the experimental compartments, and no injuries occurred. 
 
Results 
Focal rats helped their previously cooperative partners more often than their previously defecting 
partners (GLMM: β= -0.293 ± 0.108, z= -2.702, N= 20, P= 0.007; Fig. 2). Rats did not differ in their 
response to partners that had either ‘pushed’ or ‘pulled’ food for them during the experience phase 
(GLMM: β= -0.070 ± 0.107, z= -0.651, N= 20, P= 0.51; Fig. 2; the performance of all animals during all 
trials is shown in Appendix Fig. A2). 
The latencies to start helping cooperating or defecting partners did not differ (Cox proportional hazard 
model: coefficient = -0.051 ± 0.254, χ²1= 0.04, N= 20, P= 0.84). Overall, rats pulled approximately 30 s 
earlier than they pushed to help partners (Cox proportional hazard model: coefficient = 1.265 ± 0.277, 
χ²1= 20.81, N= 20, P< 0.001; see Appendix and Appendix Fig. A3). 
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Discussion 
Our results demonstrate that Norway rats can generalize their behavioural response to received help. 
Receiving help raises the cooperation propensity of rats towards the provider irrespective of the task 
by which it can be returned, which may be based on ‘gratitude’ (de Waal & Brosnan, 2006; 
McCullough, Kimeldorf, & Cohen, 2016) or an adjustment of the general ‘attitude’ of an individual 
towards a social partner (de Waal, 2000). The results cannot be explained as an undirected increase 
in food delivery propensities after experiencing cooperative partners, as in similar experimental set-
ups rats have been repeatedly shown to supply very little after receiving help from a partner when 
the neighbouring compartment was empty (Rutte & Taborsky, 2007, 2008; Schweinfurth & Taborsky, 
2016). To the best of our knowledge, this is the first experimental evidence that animals other than 
primates tested in a variant of the iterated prisoner’s dilemma situation generalize their own 
cooperation experience by reciprocating received service through a different task. 
The cognitive process underlying this accomplishment might appear to be highly challenging. Indeed, 
reciprocal cooperation has been assumed to be cognitively too demanding to be shown among 
nonhuman animals (Hammerstein, 2003; Stevens & Hauser, 2004), especially when involving different 
currencies (Stevens & Gilby, 2004). However, complex cognitive capacities are not necessarily involved 
in such reciprocal exchange. Assigning a trait, attitude or emotion to certain group members based on 
their previous behaviour can reduce costs of future interactions in many different contexts. For 
instance, by determining and remembering the fighting ability of previously met opponents, risk of 
injury can be reduced by avoiding escalated conflicts with certain partners in the future. Similar 
benefits may accrue from avoiding previously mated conspecifics. Likewise, previous amicable 
behaviour received from a social partner may change the attitude of a subject towards this individual 
(attitudinal reciprocity: Brosnan & de Waal, 2002; de Waal, 2000). Furthermore, receiving help may 
modulate emotions on a longer timescale (Schino et al., 2007). Both attitudinal and emotionally based 
reciprocity can account for cooperation shown across contexts, without being cognitively more 
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demanding than cooperation exchanged within the same type of service (see also Schino & Aureli, 
2010). Such ability seems very beneficial; therefore the capability of transferring the consequence of 
social experience between contexts is likely to be under positive selection, as has been suggested for 
monkeys (Seyfarth & Cheney, 2003). Norway rats live in variable, often large and complex groups 
characterized by stable dominance hierarchies (Adams & Boice, 1983), which affects access to food 
and mates (Whishaw & Whishaw, 1996). Therefore, understanding each other’s dominance position, 
for example, seems beneficial to avoid needless conflict and to compete successfully for resources. 
Similar benefits might ensue from knowing each other’s propensity to cooperate, and associating this 
with different social contexts. 
It has been argued that Pavlovian association might suffice to explain the ability of rats to reciprocate 
received help (Zentall, 2015). In addition, rats are known to commonly copy conspecific behaviour, 
including the imitation of observed behaviours (Zentall & Levine, 1972). However, our results showing 
that rats receiving help by one task return it with a different service clearly rule out that reciprocity in 
rats merely reflects copying behaviour. Furthermore, even if Pavlovian conditioning might be involved 
in the behavioural regulation of the rats’ response to received help, it cannot account for the observed 
transfer between different tasks as shown by our results (see Dolivo, Rutte, & Taborsky, 2016 for 
additional arguments that mere Pavlovian association processes cannot explain reciprocal 
cooperation in rats). Further, rats have been experimentally shown to also reciprocate allogrooming, 
a naturally occurring behaviour where no training is involved; this again suggests that reciprocal 
cooperation in rats cannot be a mere by-product of conditioning (Schweinfurth, Stieger, & Taborsky, 
2017). 
Contingency between different cooperative tasks as observed in our wild-type Norway rats is 
frequently observed in humans (Jaeggi & Gurven, 2013; Jaeggi, Hooper, Beheim, Kaplan, & Gurven, 
2016) and might also exist in other animals. Simpler cognitive mechanisms than those used in 
calculating outcomes, such as attitudinal, symmetry-, or emotion-based mechanisms, may also 
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underlie the reciprocal help across different services in other species where correlative evidence 
suggests such trading (Carter & Wilkinson, 2013; Fraser & Bugnyar, 2012; Romero & Aureli, 2008). The 
presumption that reciprocal cooperation among nonhuman animals is rare (Clutton-Brock, 2009; 
Hammerstein, 2003; Stevens, Cushman, & Hauser, 2005) is probably more apparent than real (Carter, 
2014; Taborsky, 2013; Taborsky et al., 2016). It may partly result from the fact that reciprocity is 
difficult to detect when it takes place between different commodities or social contexts. In this study, 
we used the same currency, food, to investigate reciprocal trading. By using different currencies in 
future studies, it can be clarified whether rats also trade different commodities reciprocally, for 
instance grooming for food.  
Conclusion 
Our results show that Norway rats respond to the cooperation levels of social partners and transfer 
experienced help to a different cooperative task, which suggests behavioural generalization and 
reciprocal trading. This might reflect a mechanism allowing for appropriate responses to the 
cumulative information about the social behaviour of different group members in a complex society, 
setting the stage for group members to negotiate and trade different commodities and services among 
each other. 
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Figure 1. Test procedure 
In the experience phase, focal rats either experienced a cooperator producing rewards for them by 
pulling a platform into the focal rat’s compartment or by pushing a lever, or they experienced a 
defector that did not produce food for them with either mechanism. In the test phase, the roles were 
exchanged and focal rats could produce food for their social partner by using the alternative 
mechanism. Each focal rat was tested in all four situations with four different partners. 
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Figure 2. Help provided by focal rats to previously cooperating and defecting partners 
Medians and interquartile ranges of food donated by focal rats during the test phase to partners that 
previously cooperated or defected by using the ‘pulling’ (dashed line) or ‘pushing’ (solid line) task are 
shown.  
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Appendix 
Latency to start donating food to the social partner 
Besides the amount of help provided, the latency until the first food item is donated has been shown 
to indicate the motivation of rats to cooperate (Dolivo & Taborsky, 2015; Schneeberger, Dietz, & 
Taborsky, 2012). Consequently, we checked whether the latency to start providing food for 
cooperators was shorter than that for providing food to defectors. However, this was not the case, as 
found also in a previous study testing for generalized reciprocity (Rutte & Taborsky, 2007). The timing 
of food provisioning in our experiment might not easily indicate the motivation of focal rats to 
cooperate. Focal rats pulled earlier than they pushed, suggesting that rats preferred to help by this 
device than by the other. This may be explained by the different force rats must exert to use each 
task. To push the lever rats had to exert the force of 0.24 N, whereas to pull the stick they just needed 
0.14 N. Further, in contrast to previous studies, here focal rats were provided with a different device 
to their partners; therefore, the latency to the first food donation may not represent well the 
motivation to help the partner. However, although the latencies to start helping defectors and 
cooperators did not differ, the quantity of help provided clearly diverged (see Fig. 2).  
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Figure A1. Pushing mechanism 
When the rat pushed the lever, a trapdoor in the grey plastic tube opened releasing a food item, which 
fell into the partner’s compartment.  
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Figure A2. Help provided by each individual focal rat to previously cooperating and defecting 
partners 
The graph shows the frequency of donations provided by focal individuals to partners that had used 
either the pulling (indicated by solid lines) or the pushing mechanism (indicated by dashed lines) 
during the experience phase. Because some lines completely overlapped, we raised eight of them 
slightly to make them visible.  
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Figure A3. Latency to the first donation given by focal rats to previously helpful partners 
The Kaplan–Meier plots show the calculated cumulative probability to help in relation to the time 
course of the experiment. 
